Varying Contracts in the Supreme Court by Davies, PS
VARYING CONTRACTS IN THE SUPREME COURT 
 
ROCK Advertising Ltd. v MWB Business Exchange Centres Ltd. [2018] UKSC 24 
raised two fundamental issues in the law of contract. First, can an oral variation be 
effective in the face of a no-oral modification (“NOM”) clause? Secondly, is part 
payment of a debt good consideration for satisfaction of the debt? The majority of the 
Supreme Court answered “No” to the first question, overturning the Court of Appeal 
(noted [2016] C.L.J. 455). None of the Justices felt it necessary or appropriate to 
answer the second question. It is suggested that both questions should have been dealt 
with differently. 
Rock occupied as licensee premises managed by MWB. Rock decided to 
expand, and entered into a written agreement with MWB for larger premises for 12 
months beginning 1 November 2011. The agreed licence fee was £3,500 per month 
for the first three months, and £4,433.34 subsequently. Rock’s business was not 
successful, and by February 2012 it had incurred arrears of over £12,000. The parties 
orally agreed to re-schedule the licence fee payments due from February to October 
2012: Rock would pay less for the first few months, and more subsequently, so the 
arrears would be cleared by the end of the year. Nevertheless, MWB later sought to 
enforce the original terms of the agreement and sued for the arrears. 
Clause 7.6 in the original contract stated: “All variations to this licence must 
be agreed, set out in writing and signed on behalf of both parties before they take 
effect.” Lord Sumption, with whom Lady Hale, Lord Wilson and Lord Lloyd-Jones 
agreed, held that this clause was legally effective. Therefore the purported oral 
variation of the contract could not be enforced. Lord Sumption observed that NOM 
clauses prevent attempts to undermine written agreements by informal means; avoid 
disputes about whether a variation was intended and what its terms were; and make it 
easier for corporations to police internal rules restricting individuals’ authority to 
agree to contractual variations. These are pragmatic justifications that may reflect 
parties’ legitimate commercial reasons for inserting NOM clauses (see Morgan [2017] 
C.L.J. 589). 
 However, this approach of the Supreme Court towards NOM clauses 
represents a significant departure from that of other common law jurisdictions. This 
might be contrasted with other statements from the Supreme Court favouring 
harmonisation throughout the common law world (see e.g. FHR European Ventures 
LLP v Cedar Capital Partners LLC [2014] UKSC 45, [2015] A.C. 250, at [45]). The 
traditional approach of the common law has been encapsulated in the observation of 
Cardozo J. in Alfred C Beatty v Guggenheim Exploration Company (1919) 225 N.Y. 
380, 387: “Those who make a contract, may unmake it. The clause which forbids a 
change, may be changed like any other. The prohibition of oral waiver, may itself be 
waived. … Whenever two men contract, no limitation self-imposed can destroy their 
power to contract again …”  
 Lord Sumption thought objections to his preferred approach to be “entirely 
conceptual” (at [13]). But that does not render them any less persuasive. Conceptual 
clarity is important. Parties are free to enter into contracts, without (generally) any 
requirements of form. If the parties intend to be bound, and consideration is provided 
to support the promises made, then a contract arises. The same should be true of 
variation. Just as Parliament cannot bind its successors, nor should a contract prevent 
future contracts. The conceptual point can be reinforced by querying where the limits 
of MWB lie: can a clause prevent any variation at all? Or novation? Or waiver? If so, 
the restriction an earlier term puts on the parties’ later freedom of contract is stark 
and, it is suggested, unfortunate. It may be that the decision is restricted to NOM 
clauses for pragmatic reasons, but in the face of conceptual difficulties the limits of 
the decision in MWB are likely to come under sustained pressure.  
 Lord Sumption bolstered his decision by drawing an analogy with entire 
agreement clauses. But those clauses preclude reliance upon earlier understandings or 
agreements between the parties, such that the latest agreement (containing the entire 
agreement clause) prevails. NOM clauses have the opposite effect: the most recent 
agreement of the parties is not enforced, but the earlier agreement (containing the 
NOM clause) preferred. It is suggested that the most recent agreement of the parties 
should be enforced. Lord Sumption’s assertion that enforcing the most recent 
agreement “override[s] the parties’ intentions” (at [11]) is therefore contestable: 
viewed from the perspective of what the parties intended at the date of the variation 
(rather than the original contract date), the opposite is true.  
Lord Briggs’ approach was more nuanced than that of the majority. He 
thought that an oral variation may be effective, provided the parties agree expressly or 
by necessary implication to dispense with the NOM clause. This is preferable to the 
bold approach of the majority, but still unnecessarily restrictive. Where parties have 
reached an agreement that is supported by consideration, courts should give effect to 
that agreement. If it varies an earlier contract, so be it. The last in time should prevail.  
In following the Supreme Court’s approach, it is likely that increased attention 
will be given to doctrines such as estoppel, which provide some protection against the 
strict enforcement of NOM clauses. But Lord Sumption was keen to stress (at [16]) 
that “the scope of estoppel cannot be so broad as to destroy the whole advantage of 
certainty” sought from NOM clauses. Nevertheless, it is to be expected that many 
disputes will focus upon estoppel: what will need to be established for the defence of 
estoppel to succeed? Will an estoppel have only suspensory effect? 
On the facts of MWB all the Justices agreed that the oral variation was 
ineffective. This made it unnecessary to discuss the doctrine of consideration. Yet the 
law in this area is riddled with difficulties. In Foakes v Beer (1884) 9 App. Cas. 605 
the House of Lords held that part payment of a debt was not good consideration for 
the extinguishment of the debt. But, as Lord Sumption recognised, the more recent 
approach of the Court of Appeal in Williams v Roffey Bros & Nicholls (Contractors) 
Ltd. [1991] 1 Q.B. 1 is difficult to reconcile with Foakes. In Roffey, the court found 
that a promise to pay more might be supported by consideration if the promisor 
“obtains in practice a benefit or obviates a disbenefit” ([1991] 1 Q.B. 1 at 16). In In re 
Selectmove Ltd. [1995] 1 W.L.R. 474 the Court of Appeal did not extend such 
reasoning to part-payment of a debt. But the Court of Appeal in MWB appeared to 
differ from Selectmove and apply Roffey instead of Foakes in the context of part-
payment. 
The reluctance of the Supreme Court to grapple with this issue of 
consideration is understandable. If the court had split in obiter dicta, additional 
confusion may have resulted. But as Lord Sumption acknowledged at the very start of 
his judgment, “[m]odern litigation rarely raises truly fundamental issues in the law of 
contract” (at [1]). It is perhaps unlikely that the Supreme Court will soon be presented 
with the opportunity to revisit this issue. Lord Sumption’s unsurprising recognition (at 
[18]) that Foakes “is probably ripe for re-examination” may provide some 
encouragement to parties to take the point to the Supreme Court, but that is an 
expensive process with an uncertain outcome; both Roffey and Selectmove settled 
before being heard by the House of Lords.  
It is suggested that it is unfortunate that their Lordships side-stepped 
consideration, especially because the issue had been fully argued. The Supreme Court 
often deals with points not necessary for the outcome of the case (e.g. In the matter of 
an application by the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission for Judicial 
Review (Northern Ireland) [2018] UKSC 27, [2018] H.R.L.R. 14), and sometimes 
even signals a departure from earlier House of Lords’ authority in obiter dicta (e.g. 
Ivey v Genting Casinos UK Ltd. [2017] UKSC 67, [2017] 3 W.L.R. 1212). Lord 
Sumption thought “an enlarged panel of the court” would be needed, but this may not 
have been any more helpful (see e.g. Burrows (2013) 127 L.Q.R. 305, 307-309) and is 
not invariably necessary to depart from earlier decisions of the House of Lords (e.g. 
Ivey). Moreover, the size of the panel is determined by the Supreme Court itself; it is 
odd that it did not decide to sit in an enlarged panel if this would have been important 
had the issue of NOM clauses been decided differently. 
In the wake of the Supreme Court decision in MWB, Kerr J. has reiterated, 
albeit with some reluctance, the orthodox view that a “practical benefit” does not 
constitute good consideration for payment of part of an existing debt, since 
Selectmove remains binding (Simantob v Shavleyan (t/a Yacob’s Gallery) [2018] 
EWHC 2005 (QB) at [119]-[138]). That approach is most consistent with Foakes. Yet 
in MWB the Court of Appeal held that MWB did receive consideration for accepting a 
less advantageous schedule of payments: MWB would ultimately be likely to recover 
a greater sum through the rescheduling of payments, and, importantly, MWB would 
avoid the property standing empty for some time, causing further loss. Lord Sumption 
recognised that “[t]hese were both expectations of practical value, but neither was a 
contractual entitlement” (at [18]). In Simantob, Kerr J. did not consider the tension 
between the decisions of the Court of Appeal in Selectmove and MWB. But since the 
Supreme Court in MWB did not overturn the Court of Appeal on the issue of 
consideration, the decision of the latter is likely to continue to prove troublesome. The 
law on consideration in the context of variation remains in a mess.    
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